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ARGUMENT 
LIEBERMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
1. Liberal Construction Rules Do Not Apply When Utah Law Does not 
Support Such an Award. 
Appellees argue that because Utah law promotes liberal construction of the Workers' 
Compensation Act (the "Act"), additional benefits are justified in this case. Appellants agree 
that Utah's courts and the Labor Commission should construe the Act in favor of coverage 
and compensation. See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). However, 
this command does not dispense with the requirement that an injured party prove his case by 
a preponderance of the evidence. See Lipman v. Ind. Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). 
Indeed, this court held in Jackson v. Industrial Comm'n, Memorandum Decision, 920804-
CA (Utah Ct. App. 1993), that "regardless of the remedial nature of the worker's 
compensation statutes, a liberal construction cannot relieve the applicant from the threshold 
requirement to demonstrate causation." Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (allowing 
workers' compensation benefits only if requirements of this provision are met). 
As previously stated in appellants' initial brief and below, appellants are not liable to 
pay additional workers' compensation benefits due to the applicant's failure to meet the legal 
causation test articulated in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and its 
progeny, Large v. Industrial Comm'n. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Stokes v. 
Board of Rev, of Ind. Comm'n. 832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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2. The Direct and Natural Consequences Rule is Synonymous with the 
Proximate Causation Test. 
Relying on the "direct and natural consequences rule" articulated in Larson's treatise 
and Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm'n. 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
appellees maintain that additional benefits are awardable in this case. It is important to note 
that in application, the "direct and natural consequences rule" articulated in Intermountain 
and Larsons is synonymous with the proximate causation test applied in older Utah cases. 
Compare A. Larson's Workers Compensation Law (Desk Edition) § 13.10 et. seq. with § 
6.60. See Appellants' initial brief at 4. As stated in Large, proximate causation involves an 
analysis of "foreseeability, negligence and intervening causes." Large, 758 P.2d at 956. In 
Aetna Life Ins. v. Industrial Comm'n, 231 P. 442 (Utah 1924) the Utah Supreme Court 
defined proximate cause as "that cause which naturally lead to, and which might have 
expected to produce the result." Id at 444. The direct and natural consequences rule, 
articulated by appellee and undoubtedly applied by the Commission, similarly involves the 
analysis of foreseeability, natural results, intervening causes, and the fault of the claimant or 
doctor, etc. See, e.g., Intermountain, 839 P.2d at 845; Mountain States Casing Serv. 
McKean, 706 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 1985); Larsons (Desk Edition) § 13.11 to 13.21. 
However, in light of Allen, the Labor Commission's evaluation of this case based upon these 
factors, especially fault, amounts to legal error. 
3. The Proximate Causation Test is Not the Appropriate Legal Test, Rather 
the Allen Legal Causation test Applies. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has clearly ruled in two post-Allen cases that a fault and 
proximate causation analysis is "not appropriate for workers' compensation cases." Large, 
758 P.2d at 956; see Stokes. 832 P.2d at 62; Appellants' initial brief at 12-16. In fact, this 
Court held in Stokes that a proper analysis in workers compensation cases is the Allen legal 
causation standard rather than a proximate causation and fault-based analysis. Despite this 
precedent, however, Appellees maintain that Intermountain is inconsistent with Large and 
Stokes and instead applies here. While we agree that the legal principles articulated in Large 
and Stokes are somewhat inconsistent with the court's ruling in Intermountain, we believe 
that the inconsistency is easily explained by a careful review of these cases. Specifically, in 
Intermountain, the court stated: 
We do not agree with IHC that the correct standard for determining employer 
liability for subsequent injuries occurring after an industrial injury essentially 
amounts to a "but for1' analysis. In Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKean, 
706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] subsequent 
injury is compensable if it is found to be a natural result of a compensable 
primary injury." Id. at 602 (emphasis added). A claimant "is not required to 
show that his original tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent injury, but 
only that the initial work-related accident was a contributing cause ,f of the 
subsequent injury. Id. (emphasis added). McKean and Perchelli both draw 
from Larson's statement of the general rule regarding workers' compensation, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an 
aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is 
compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a 
compensable primary injury.... 
The applicable test includes an analysis of the facts surrounding the subsequent 
injury and analysis of the connection between the subsequent injury and the 
original compensable industrial injury. 
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Intermountain, 839 P.2d at 845-46. 
Appellants respectfully submit that this Court erroneously relied upon pre-Allen case 
law in rendering its decision in Intermountain. Stokes, decided the same year as 
Intermountain accurately states that the Allen legal causation standard applies in workers 
compensation matters rather than a fault and proximate causation analysis. See Stokes, 832 
P.2d at 62. Given the fact that the Intermountain decision relies upon cases pre-dating Allen, 
that case is of little precedential authority and should not be considered by this Court. 
In any event, even if this Court determines that the law is somewhat unclear, the better 
view is that proximate causation (a.k.a., the direct and natural consequences rule) should not 
apply in workers' compensation cases. First and most importantly, the Allen decision 
already provides a "legal causation" analysis which takes into consideration injuries where 
a person has a preexisting condition and then suffers a subsequent, contributing injury, such 
as in this case. Under Allen, the analysis for this case is simple and straight-forward.1 
Contrary to appellees' assertion, there is no qualification, nor should there be, that Allen's 
legal causation test applies only to primary, as opposed to exacerbations of work-related, 
1
 In this case, the application of Allen would be as follows: (1) A determination 
must be made whether a claimant has a preexisting condition. (2) The preexisting 
condition must be contribute to the injury (i.e., the fact that the claimant has any 
preexisting condition does not trigger the higher legal causation standard, the preexisting 
condition must contribute ~ be relevant - to the injury). (3) If these requirements are 
met, the application of the higher legal causation standard applies. (4) The industrial 
nature of the subsequent injury should have no part in the analysis, unless of course the 
second injury occurred in the same workplace whereupon the lower legal causation 
standard of Allen (rather than the higher standard in Allen) would of course apply. 
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injuries. Moreover, the fact that there is no case law applying post-Allen law to a case such 
as Lieberman's is simply irrelevant. Allen should apply in all contexts when a court must 
determine the liability for two contributory injuries when at least one of them is industrial. 
The second policy reason supporting appellants' position is that Utah's appellate 
courts have consistently held that the workers' compensation system is not fault-based. See 
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird, 2000 UT 94, [^19, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (stating "[t]he 
workers1 compensation system constitutes a quid pro quo between employers and employees. 
.. Under the Act's balancing of rights, 'employees are able to recover for job-related injuries 
without showing fault.'"); Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 P.2d 456 (Utah 1996) 
(stating [t]he Workers' Compensation Act is predicated entirely on the status of an 
employment relationship rather than on fault). In Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel, 965 
P.2d 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court stated: 
The [Workers' Compensation] Act is a humanitarian and economical system 
designed to provide relief to the victims of industrial accidents: 
The Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that 
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their 
employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort actions. 
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Large, this Court stated: 
We agree that a "proximate cause" analysis, as that term is commonly used, is 
not appropriate in workers' compensation cases. Proximate cause is used 
primarily in tort law and involves analysis offoreseeability, negligence and 
intervening causes. These factors are not present in the statutory workers9 
compensation system, which excludes consideration of fault. A. Larson, 1 
Workmen's Compensation Law §6.60 (1985). Although proximate cause is 
not an appropriate standard, the Utah Supreme Court has, nevertheless, 
required proof of a causal relationship as a prerequisite to awarding workers' 
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compensation benefits. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986). 
Large. 758 P.2d at 956. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission's consideration of fault — that is, whether 
Lieberman was "negligent" in jumping into the truck — was legally improper under Utah 
Supreme Court law. See Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ]fl9. Accordingly, appellants 
respectfully urge this Court to reverse the Commission's ruling and apply the legal causation 
standard articulated in Allen. 
4. Even if the Proximate Causation Test Applies, the Commission 
Committed Legal Error in Concluding that Lieberman's Act of Jumping 
into his Truck was the Natural and Direct Result of His Initial Work 
Injury 
Assuming arguendo that the proximate causation analysis applies, whether 
Lieberman's own act of jumping into his truck breaks the necessary chain of causation under 
this test is a matter of law. Accordingly, the Commission's ruling that Lieberman was not 
"negligent" need not be reviewed by this Court under any discretionary standard, but rather 
must be reviewed for correctness. 
Basic proximate causation principles, having their origin in tort law, require that there 
be a causal connection between the original and subsequent injury. See Mountain States, 706 
P.2d at 602-03. If there is no causal connection between the initial and subsequent injury, 
the latter will constitute an independent (a.k.a, superceding) intervening cause, breaking the 
chain of causation. See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 180(b). As stated in 
6 
appellants' initial brief, Lieberman's act of jumping into his vehicle was not a "natural result 
o f the first injury. It was not a medical complication that flowed from the original accident, 
see Perchelli v. Utah Ind. Comm'n. 475 P.2d 835, 837-38 (Utah 1970), but rather was an 
entirely new accident which breaks the chain of causation. Moreover, contrary to appellee's 
assertion, Lieberman's act of jumping into his vehicle can be considered superceding simply 
because it is attributable to the claimant's own negligence (i.e., carelessness and inattention). 
See Mountain States, 706 P.2d at 603. Accordingly, even if the proximate causation 
standard applies, the Commission legally erred in concluding that the May 22, 1999 event 
did not relieve McKesson of liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the Labor Commission's decision 
to award Lieberman additional workers compensation benefits. The Commission selected 
the incorrect legal standard to this matter. The proper legal test is the Allen legal causation 
test. In any event, even if the Commission selected the appropriate legal standard, it wrongly 
applied it in this case. 
If this Court chooses to apply the standard set forth by Appellees and in 
Intermountain, the legal causation rule will hinge on when the industrial accident occurred 
(ie., whether the industrial accident preceded or followed an industrial or non-industrial 
accident). This was certainly not the intent of the Workers Compensation Act or the 
Supreme Court in delineating the Allen legal causation test. Because the appropriate 
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standard is Allen's legal causation test, this Court must remand this matter to the Labor 
Commission for proper evaluation. 
Respectfully submitted this hr~ day of ->\pA \ 2001. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Henry K. Cnai II 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellants McKesson Corp. and 
C.W. Reese Co. 
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